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Many quantum key distribution systems employ a laser followed by an optical attenuator to
prepare weak coherent states in the source. Their mean photon number must be pre-calibrated to
guarantee the security of key distribution. Here we experimentally show that this calibration can
be broken with a high-power laser attack. We have tested four fiber-optic attenuator types used
in quantum key distribution systems, and found that two of them exhibit a permanent decrease in
attenuation after laser damage. This results in higher mean photon numbers in the prepared states
and may allow an eavesdropper to compromise the key.
I. INTRODUCTION
Ideally, quantum key distribution (QKD) [1, 2]
promises information-theoretic security owing to the solid
foundation of quantum mechanics. However, there are of-
ten implementation flaws and equipment imperfections,
which can be exploited by an eavesdropper Eve to reduce
the security of the secret key. This attempt is referred
to as “quantum hacking”, drawing the parallel with tra-
ditional cybersecurity. The capability of Eve to compro-
mise the security of QKD systems has previously been
shown [3–15], especially against single-photon detec-
tors [6, 12, 16–23], and also was field-demonstrated [24]
with current technology.
To protect a QKD system from detector-side loopholes,
measurement-device-independent QKD (MDI QKD) has
been proposed [25] and implemented not only in the lab-
oratory [26, 27] but also in the field [28, 29]. MDI QKD
removes the security assumption about the measurement
station, which can even be an untrusted party [25]. How-
ever, the sources, are still assumed to be in secure labo-
ratories, which might not be true in a practical scenario.
Side channels may still exist during quantum-state prepa-
ration. Therefore, it is important to further investigate
practical vulnerabilities of the source station, to be able
to correct and improve its security.
A QKD system often employs a weak coherent laser
as a source, with a mean photon number attenuated to
single-photon levels using an optical attenuator. Thus,
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the majority of non-empty pulses contain a single pho-
ton, which cannot be split off by Eve and measured sepa-
rately. There is however a small portion of multi-photon
pulses from the inherent Poissonian statistics behind the
optical attenuation. The side effect of the multi-photon
states can be eliminated by applying decoy-state proto-
col [30–32]. However, if the optical attenuation compo-
nent itself can be altered and its attenuation decreased,
either permanently or temporarily, the assumption about
the mean photon number may be broken. Eve can then
compromise the security of the QKD system [33–36]. In
particular, even a very small increase of the mean pho-
ton number requires a correction to the secret key rate
in decoy-state BB84 and MDI QKD protocols, otherwise
the key becomes insecure [36].
In a source’s apparatus, an optical attenuator is usu-
ally the last component that optical pulses go through
before they are sent to a quantum channel [28, 37–45]
However, for Eve, the attenuator is the first component
she sees, looking at the source’s apparatus from the net-
work side. High-power laser damage of other components
in QKD systems has been demonstrated before [10, 13].
We suspect that a high-power laser shining through the
output fiber to the source can affect the performance of
the attenuator. The changes in its characteristics will
then occur before those in other components, because
the attenuator dissipates most of the power (assuming
a reasonably equal threshold of failure in components).
We have selected four types of optical attenuators from
four different QKD systems and attempted to alter their
performance under laser damage. This has been done in
an optical setup similar to a live QKD system.
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2The Article is structured as follows. We first dis-
cuss the power handling capability of single-mode fiber
in Sec. II, which gives us an estimate of the maximum
power we can apply in the experiment and also in a
live system. Section III introduces the experimental
setup and methodology. The testing results are presented
in Sec. IV. Briefly, one type of attenuator has survived
our testing intact, another exhibited a small temporary
attenuation drop, and the remaining two types exhibited
a significant and permanent decrease in attenuation. We
update the statistical risk prediction for untested QKD
systems in Sec. V, discuss ideas for countermeasures in
Sec. VI, and conclude in Sec. VII.
II. OPTICAL POWER HANDLING CAPACITY
OF SINGLE-MODE FIBERS
As the first step, we should clarify that how much op-
tical power can be transmitted through a single-mode
fiber. Here we set a restriction that Eve can use only
the standard single-mode fiber as in a typical QKD sys-
tem. The amount of optical power that can be sent to
the attenuator in the source is limited by the inherent
handling capability of the single-mode fiber, as well as
the maximum power of the laser used in the attack.
A laser-induced damage threshold (LIDT) of the stan-
dard single-mode fiber is theoretically limited by the soft-
ening point of silica and its tolerance to thermally in-
duced stress [46]. However, in reality, thermal damage
likely happens at the fiber connection points or the in-
terface between the fiber core and the cladding [46, 47].
A fiber fuse phenomenon can be triggered by high tem-
peratures at a fiber end facet [48, 49]. This can be
reproduced by contacting the fiber end against an ab-
sorptive material, such as metal, or by using a flame
(∼ 2700 ◦C) [50]. It has been experimentally demon-
strated that a 2–5 W continuous-wave (c.w.) laser can
initiate the fiber fuse [48, 50]. However, in our testing
of a 20-m long single-mode fiber ending with no termi-
nation (a 90◦ cleave), when no deliberate method was
applied attempting to trigger the fiber fuse, it was able
to tolerate 9 W c.w. laser, the specified maximum power
of our laser source.
Power loss in the fiber limits the power that can be
delivered to the target. The major threat comes from
backward scatterings in the optical fiber, especially the
backward stimulated Raman scattering (SRS) and stim-
ulated Brillouin scattering (SBS) [51]. Generally, dur-
ing light transmission, a fraction of incident light can be
transferred from one optical field to another field with fre-
quency shift, due to molecular vibrations of the transmis-
sion medium. The frequency-shifted light is called Stokes
wave. The intensity of Stokes wave may rapidly increase
over distance, which causes further SRS and SBS. This
scattered light can travel backward to the laser source
and may destroy it. To keep the high-power laser source
safe, the SRS and SBS thresholds need to be confirmed.
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FIG. 1. Simulated backward SRS and SBS thresholds. The
latter assumes a wideband source; see text for details.
The threshold is defined as the incident pump power Pth
at which the backward Stokes power Ps becomes equal
to the power at the fiber output [51]
Pthe
−αL = Ps(L), (1)
where α is the fiber loss (typically 0.05 km−1 at 1550 nm),
and L is the transmission distance in km. Equation (1)
indicates that the threshold is dependent on the fiber
length.
For the backward SRS, its threshold is given by [51]
P SRSth =
20Aeff
gRLeff
. (2)
Here Aeff is the effective core area (for the standard
single-mode fiber with the core diameter of 8 µm, Aeff =
50 µm2); gR is the Raman-gain coefficient, which is
6.67 × 10−14 m/W at 1550 nm [52]; Leff is the effective
interaction length defined as [52]
Leff =
1− e−αL
α
. (3)
Thus, the threshold value is dependent on the transmis-
sion distance. The simulation result of P SRSth versus trans-
mission distance is given in Fig. 1, which shows that the
SRS threshold drops dramatically when the fibre length
extends. However, more than 10 W optical power is al-
lowed for transmission distance shorter than 1 km.
On the other hand, the backward SBS plays a key role
in limiting the transmission power. SBS can occur at
much lower incident power level than that for SRS. The
input power threshold is quantified by [51]
P SBSth =
21Aeff
gBLeff
, (4)
where the Brillouin-gain coefficient gB = 5 ×
10−11 m/W [52]. This only allows 2.1 W as maximum
3input power at L = 10 m. Fortunately, the SBS thresh-
old can increase considerably if the spectral width of the
pump laser ∆νp is much larger than the full width at
half maximum (FWHM) of the Brillouin-gain spectrum
in SBS ∆νB [52]. Then the SBS threshold in Eq. (4) in-
creases by a factor of 1 + ∆νp/∆νB . In the experiment,
we employ a laser diode with ∆νp ≈ 10 GHz; ∆νB in
the single-mode fiber at 1550 nm is 16 MHz. The SBS
threshold in this case is also shown in Fig. 1. In this case
it is slightly higher that the SRS threshold, i.e., the latter
remains the limiting factor.
Overall, at least 10 W c.w. laser power can safely be
transmitted through 1 km single-mode fiber. In most
network installations we expect Eve to be able to con-
nect to the quantum channel within this distance of the
source. Shorter distance translates to larger fiber han-
dling capability of c.w. power, which translates to larger
power that Eve can apply to the attenuator in the source.
In our experiment, we use an amplified laser source pro-
viding up to 9 W c.w. power and transmit it through a
20 m long fiber. The feasibility of longer transmission is
theoretically verified by the models above.
III. TESTING METHOD
A. Experimental setup
The test of the optical attenuators has been conducted
using the setup shown in Fig. 2. The experimental
scheme mimics a hacking scenario for a running QKD
system. The test laser is a fiber-pigtailed 1550 nm laser
diode (Gooch & Housego AA1406), acting as the laser
in the source. This laser provides 5 mW c.w. light to
measure the attenuation of the optical attenuator under
test. The input of this attenuator is connected to the test
laser through a 50:50 fiber beamsplitter (BS). Power me-
ter A (Joinwit JW3208) monitors the power of the test
laser, and power meter C (Thorlabs PM200 with S154C
sensor) serves to check the attenuation of the optical at-
tenuator before and after optical damage. An erbium-
ytterbium doped fiber amplifier (EDFA) provides up to
9 W c.w. power, which is applied to the optical atten-
uator through a 99 : 1 BS. A fiber-pigtailed laser diode
emitting in a broad 1550.06–1550.14 nm band (QPhoton-
ics QFBGLD-1550-100) set at 20 mW c.w. power is used
as a seed source for the EDFA. Power meter B (Thorlabs
PM200 with S146C sensor) measures the optical power
at the EDFA’s output. This scheme mimics a live sce-
nario in which Eve injects light into QKD source station
via the quantum channel.
The attenuation of the optical attenuator is determined
by comparing the readings from the power meters A and
C, taking into account the additional 20 dB attenuation
of the 99 :1 BS. This measurement is first performed for
each attenuator with the optical amplifier and seed laser
turned off, so that the initial attenuation is calibrated
before any attempted tampering. The same measure-
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FIG. 2. Simplified diagram of experimental setup, with the
optical attenuator as a replaceable device under test. The
output of erbium-ytterbium doped fiber amplifier (EDFA) is
fusion-spliced to the 99% arm of the fiber beamsplitter. All
fibers are standard single-mode.
ment is repeated again after each laser damage test. Any
attenuation change after activating the EDFA can then
be attributed to optical damage within the setup. We
have verified separately that during and after our testing
up to the maximum 9 W power, the beamsplitters do
not significantly change their splitting ratio. Thus any
measured attenuation change is localised in the optical
attenuator. In case bulkhead fiber-optic connectors get
burnt (that some of the tested attenuator types use), we
treat it as an outcome of Eve’s attack that would cause
a denial of service in the actual QKD system [13].
Our high-power light source in this experiment is the
custom-made 1550 nm erbium-ytterbium doped fiber am-
plifier, manufactured by QGLex. It is designed us-
ing core pumping at the first stage and double-cladding
pumping at the second stage. This allows for high gain
and can accommodate the input seed power as low as
0.4 mW, which is amplified to a maximum of about 9 W
(39.5 dBm) through a standard single-mode fiber (SMF-
28) with a high slope efficiency of 28%. This amplifier has
additional suppression of amplified spontaneous emission
(ASE) at 1.0 µm. A significant presence of ASE could
lead to spurious lasing at 1.0 µm and limitation of the
energy transfer process from the ytterbium ions to the
erbium, which would limit the output power level and ef-
ficiency. The EDFA exhibits single mode behaviour and
a high slope efficiency. Before our experiment, the out-
put power of the EDFA has been calibrated using power
meter B (Fig. 2). This calibration provides an accurate
relation between the software setpoint for the EDFA and
its actual output power.
In case a fiber fuse [48, 49] occurs in the device under
test while applying high power during the experiment, an
automatic monitoring and shutdown system protects the
rest of the setup. We have implemented it with two Si
photodiode sensors placed laterally along the fiber jacket.
The sensors detect thermal visible light emitted by hot
plasma in the fiber fuse as it propagates past them. One
sensor is placed at the attenuator output, and another
at the output of the EDFA (Fig. 2). If either of them
detects light, a monitoring circuit shuts down the pump
in the EDFA. This shuts off the emission and stops the
fiber fuse at the sensor. This circuit has activated several
times during our tests, preventing extensive damage to
4TABLE I. Summary of test results for all attenuator samples. For the last attenuator type the number of samples means the
number of individually tested points across the variable-density disk of a single device sample. For variable attenuators, the
average change in attenuation after damage ∆ is measured at their attenuation setpoint used during the laser damage. Attack
threshold is the laser power at which the attenuator starts to exhibit more than 1 dB drop in attenuation. Failure threshold
denotes the power at which the attenuator begins to fail catastrophically, increasing its attenuation by more than 3 dB.
Type Manufacturer and part number
Number of samples Average success
∆ (dB)
Average attack
threshold (dBm)
Average failure
threshold (dBm)Total tested Success Critical failure
Manual VOA
OZ Optics BB-700-11-1550-
8/125-P-60-3A3A-1-1-LL
2 0 0 – – –
Fixed unspecifieda 12 4 6 −1.37 34.0 37.2
MEMS VOA unspecifieda 13 8 4 −5.34 36.2 36.6
VDMC VOA unspecifieda (25) (18) 0 −9.59 34.5 36.5
a Intormation withheld at the request of QKD manufacturer.
the equipment.
B. Test procedure
We can define a successfully “hacked” sample as one
having a drop in attenuation after optical damage. For
variable attenuators, this drop needs to be observed
within their range of attenuation setpoints used in a QKD
system. To quantify the result, we set a threshold of 1 dB
drop in attenuation (which we can reliably measure above
experimental errors) after damage, beyond which the at-
tack is deemed to be successful. This drop approximately
corresponds to 26% increase in the mean photon number
within the quantum channel. We also arbitrarily define
a critical attack failure as the situation when the atten-
uator exhibits an attenuation increase larger than 3 dB,
corresponding to a drop in the mean photon number of
about 50%.
For each optical attenuator sample, our testing pro-
cedure has been the following. The test laser is always
on. The EDFA applies high power starting at 316 mW
(25 dBm) for at least 10 s. Afterward, the EDFA is
turned off and the attenuation is measured. If no change
in the attenuation has occurred, the high power is in-
creased by 0.5–1 dBm and the steps above are repeated.
Once a change in attenuation (< −1 dB or > 3 dB) is
detected, the testing is stopped. If the maximum EDFA
power of 9 W is applied with no change in attenuation,
the testing is also stopped. We have observed that the
attenuators heat up during the high-power exposure and
take time to cool down, during which temporary changes
in attenuation have been recorded for some samples. A
permanent change in attenuation may then remain after
it has fully cooled down to the room temperature.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
A total of four types of optical attenuators have been
tested. Of these, one type appears to be minimally af-
fected by optical damage up to 9 W (39.5 dBm); an-
other type consistently shows a temporary decrease in
attenuation. The two remaining types exhibit perma-
nent changes in attenuation after being subjected to the
high-power laser. A summary of the laser damage results
is presented in Table I.
A. Manual variable attenuator
The first attenuator is a manually adjustable type
(OZ Optics BB-700-11-1550-8/125-P-60-3A3A-1-1-LL)
with a range of 1.5 to 80 dB. It consists of a minia-
ture fiber bench with two collimating lenses that expand
the beam to ∼ 1 mm diameter and couple it back into
fiber. The collimated beam is being partially obstructed
by an opaque tip of a metal screw. Rotating the screw
adjusts how much it is inserted into the beam, thus the
amount of attenuation.
We have tested this attenuator set at 31 dB, cor-
responding to an almost complete blocking of the
beam with the screw. The attenuator’s polarisation-
maintaining fiber pigtail has been spliced to the single-
mode fiber at the high-power side. We have not observed
any change in the attenuation even at the highest avail-
able laser power of 9 W (39.5 dBm) applied continuously
for 20 min. The attenuator case reached an equilibrium
temperature of 234 ◦C at this power, as measured using
a thermal imaging camera. This has led to discoloration
of the black anodised coating on the aluminum case, and
deformation of plastic strain relief sleeves. A closer vi-
sual inspection of the optical blocking material at the
adjustable screw tip has revealed a concave dent facing
the input fiber where the laser power has been delivered.
This suggests that a higher c.w. optical power or abla-
tion from a pulsed laser might further damage the screw
with the possibility of a complete perforation. Then a
permanent decrease in attenuation might occur. I.e., our
testing of this attenuator type has been inconclusive, be-
ing limited by our experimental capabilities.
5Sample 2
Sample 1
FIG. 3. Behaviour of the fixed attenuator immediately after
being subjected to a high-power laser at 4 W (36 dBm) for
5 min. A temporary decrease in attenuation is observed until
the attenuator cools down in ∼ 10 min. The horizontal lines
indicate initially measured attenuation before the application
of high power.
B. Fixed attenuator
The second type is a fixed attenuator of nominal atten-
uation 25 dB. The attenuator is a short cylindrical mod-
ule having a male FC/PC connector at one side and fe-
male one at another side. Its physical disassembly shows
a solid axial cylinder of dark ceramic material roughly
5 mm long placed inline between the input and output
fibers, which absorbs incident light.
Immediately after the application of approximately
4 W (36 dBm) power, the fixed attenuator samples ex-
hibit a temporary decrease in attenuation. The maxi-
mum decrease of approximately 2 dB occurs in one of
the two samples at laser shutoff, as shown in Fig. 3. The
attenuation then reverts back to the initial state within
minutes. It is however still possible for Eve to exploit
this temporary decrease in attenuation, leaking parts of
the secret key [11, 33–36]. This vulnerability window
then exists only for a limited time after the high-power
exposure. At a higher power of approximately 6.3 W
(38 dBm), critical damage occurs to the absorptive el-
ement of the device, with the attenuation permanently
increased by more than 20 dB.
C. MEMS-based variable attenuator
The third type is a variable optical attenuator (VOA)
based on a micro electro-mechanical system (MEMS) el-
ement. The MEMS VOA is voltage-adjustable from a
maximum of 31–34 dB to a minimum of approximately
1 dB. Its physical disassembly shows two parallel input
and output fibers facing a reflector-lens assembly (Fig. 4).
A
B
CD
E
G
F
FIG. 4. Simplified schematic of MEMS variable optical atten-
uator, with parts labeled (not to scale). A, metal cap hold-
ing the input and output single-mode fibers; B, glass sheath;
C, collimating lens; D, voltage adjustable MEMS mirror on
torsion mount; E, adhesive filler; F, metal body; G, electrical
leads.
FIG. 5. Selected samples of MEMS VOA with permanent
decrease in attenuation after laser damage. The attenuation
decreases abruptly near 4 W (36 dBm). Horizontal lines indi-
cate the initial measured attenuation before the application of
high power. The leftmost point shown is the first application
of high power to each sample.
The voltage controls the tilt of the reflector mirror via
electrostatic force, and thus changes the amount of cou-
pling between the input and output fiber.
1. Preliminary tests on individual attenuators
We have tested 8 samples of MEMS VOAs in an un-
powered state, in which they have their maximum at-
tenuation value. Out of these tested, 3 samples exhibit
an average change of −3 dB after optical damage, as
shown in Fig. 5, which is confirmed to be permanent with
subsequent measurements after several hours and days.
The permanent decrease in attenuation occurs near laser
power of 4 W (36 dBm). Near this damage threshold,
the attenuation fluctuates when measured after turning
off the EDFA, steadily decreases, and stabilizes after a
few minutes. This is likely due to thermal effects. If
the failure threshold is exceeded, the optical attenuator
sustains catastrophic damage and its attenuation is per-
6(b) (c)
(a)
10 mm0
FIG. 6. MEMS VOAs mounted on (a) PCB. (b) Initially, the
end cap tightly inserted into the body. (c) Catastrophic struc-
tural damage in MEMS VOA sample 3 at 5.6 W (37.5 dBm).
The cap is displaced.
manently increased to > 70 dB.
2. Further tests on assembled attenuator boards
Following the initial confirmation that MEMS VOAs
are especially vulnerable to the laser damage attack and
exhibit a permanent attenuation drop after optical dam-
age, subsequent experiments have been done using com-
plete printed circuit board (PCB) mounted attenuator
assemblies received from the industry, shown in Fig. 6.
The attenuators are from two different manufacturers but
are nearly identical in their construction, here labeled
subtype A or B, and are attached using a soft silicone
glue to the PCB, providing a thermally accurate repre-
sentation of their use in the QKD system.
Our results are summarized in Table II. At the test-
ing voltage chosen, corresponding to an attenuation of
approximately 30 dB, 4 out of the 6 attenuators tested
have exhibited a permanent drop in attenuation. Fur-
thermore, for 5 out of the 6 attenuators, there exists an
attenuation range with a decrease in attenuation post-
damage, as shown by the shaded area in Fig. 7. The re-
sponse curve of the attenuation within the shaded area is
shown for all successfully damaged attenuators in Fig. 8.
We can deem the optical damage attack to be successful
within this voltage range. The range at which there is a
clear drop in attenuation is almost always at the higher
attenuation settings, and Fig. 7 shows a typical behavior
for the successfully attacked sample.
Attenuator sample 3 has exhibited a near-total fail-
ure, where the attenuation after the optical damage is
dramatically increased over its normal value. Effectively,
this is similar to a component becoming an open-circuit
FIG. 7. Typical voltage-attenuation curve of a successfully
compromised sample 1 of MEMS VOA. Blue vertical line de-
notes the voltage setting at which the laser damage is done.
The shaded area denotes the range where permanent attenu-
ation drop is observed.
FIG. 8. Attenuation change after optical damage for success-
fully compromised MEMS VOA samples. For clarity, only
control voltage points for which the attenuation has decreased
are plotted. I.e., the plotted data points correspond to points
within the shaded area in Fig. 7.
in electronics, corresponding to the optical component
blocking light. This sample represents a case of critical
failure, which is an undesirable outcome for Eve resulting
in denial of service in QKD.
Attenuator sample 5 is peculiar. When we initially
measured its attenuation-voltage curve (before applying
high optical power), the attenuation value has become
latched at 14.5 V. A subsequent voltage change down
to 0 V did not change this measured attenuation. The
14.5 V voltage, however, does appear to be in the work-
7TABLE II. Optical damage results for complete MEMS VOA assemblies. Testing voltage is the attenuator control voltage at
which high power is applied. ∆ is the change in attenuation observed at the testing voltage.
Sample Subtype
Testing
voltage (V)
Attenuation
before (dB)
Attenuation
after (dB)
∆
(dB)
Attack threshold
(dBm)
1 A 12.0 33.05 35.44 +2.39 36.5
2 A 12.0 33.88 32.95 −0.93 37.0
3 A 11.5 32.81 64.28 +31.47 37.5 (failure)
4 B 14.0 38.79 32.32 −6.47 35.5
5 B 14.5 ≈ 68 a 58.82 ≈ −9.2 36.0
6 B 13.5 31.21 22.29 −8.92 34.5
a Measurement near the minimum power range of the power meter.
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FIG. 9. Temperature profile of VOA sample 6 at the attack threshold, taken at a single point (marked ×) near the cap of the
VOA. The high power laser was set to 2.8 W (34.5 dBm) and turned on from time 0 through 232 s.
ing range for the other attenuators from manufacturer B.
Since the applied voltage is close to the maximum volt-
age specified, it is likely that the latching observed at this
voltage is from some inherent variability in the working
voltage range between components, or a manufacturing
defect. However, despite this unexpected malfunction, a
permanent decrease in attenuation after laser damage is
still observed in this sample.
3. Possible damage mechanisms
During the application of high power near the damage
threshold, the cap holding the input and output fibers
bulges outwards (Fig. 6), possibly pulling the fiber inside
the VOA out of alignment with the collimating lens.
In a catastrophic damage scenario at approximately
5.6 W (37.5 dBm), the cap detaches itself from the
attenuator casing and a puff of smoke emits from the
opening. Figure 9 shows the thermal profile of the
attenuator under high-power laser recorded using an
uncooled microbolometer-based thermal camera (FLIR
E60). As the images show, the highest temperature
occurs near the front end of the VOA casing where the
input and output fibers are inserted. Since the process
of coupling a beam of light into a single-mode fiber is
highly dependent on relative positions of the involved
optical elements [53], we hypothesize that structural
deformation under high temperature is a likely cause for
the observed change in attenuation.
Another possible cause is that for typical MEMS
materials used (Si, SiN, SiC, etc.) [54], the operating
temperature can induce lattice strain and change its
spring constant [55]. The ductility of polycrystalline
Si is reported to increase at temperatures near 500 ◦C
[55]. Since the MEMS micromirror used in the VOA
is fixed using a torsion mount, the amount of de-
flection induced by a given voltage may change with
temperature. The voltage-attenuation curve might be
different once the VOA heats up and exceeds its proper
operating temperature range, which may either result in
a drop in attenuation or an increase, depending on the
exact material behavior under high temperature. Our
observations using the thermal camera show that the
outer casing of the VOA reached 120 ◦C at the attack
81 mm0
68.5 dB69.5 dB
10 mm0
FIG. 10. Variable-density metal coating variable attenuator
opened with glass disk active element visible. Small dots
around the disk edge correspond to irradiated areas. Mag-
nified view of five damaged spots is given in the inset. The
two rightmost spots are those shown in Fig. 11.
threshold power. The internal temperature is likely to
be much higher. However, from the observations and
physical disassembly, it appears that the area near the
fiber end of the VOA is visibly more affected by thermal
damage, and not the mirror facet, which attributes some
doubt to this mechanism of damage.
D. Variable density metal coating variable
attenuator
The fourth type is a programmable VOA whose ac-
tive element is a glass disk covered with variable density
metal coating (VDMC), see Fig. 10. Collimated light
from the input fiber passes through VDMC, the glass,
gets reflected from a dielectric mirror deposited at the
back surface of the disk, then passes the glass and VDMC
again. It then enters another collimator coupling it to the
output fiber. An externally controlled motor rotates the
glass disk to expose different coating density to the beam,
adjusting attenuation in 0–80 dB range.
1. Testing results
We have tested one VDMC VOA with a total of 25
measurements over different points of the active element
corresponding to its different attenuation value settings,
as summarized in Table I. During 7 of these measure-
ments, when laser power level was below the attack
threshold, neither permanent nor temporary change in
attenuation has been observed. All the remaining sample
points have been successfully “hacked”, demonstrating a
permanent decrease in attenuation with mean change of
−9.59 dB. None of the points have been critically dam-
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FIG. 11. Typical attenuation curve of successfully compro-
mised VDMC VOA. Green vertical lines denote the attenu-
ation settings at which optical damage was done. The high
power laser applied 2.8 W (34.5 dBm) for 10 s.
aged when we applied up to 6.8 W (38.3 dBm) over up
to 15 min duration. This was the maximum power avail-
able in our test setup at the time of this last experiment,
because the EDFA has aged.
The successful attack threshold for VDMC VOA sam-
ple points depends on exposure time. In order to avoid
destruction of its active element (due to heat-induced
cracking of the glass disk) in our tests, we chose reason-
ably low exposure time of 10 s. After every 10 s of expo-
sure we switched off the EDFA for another 10 s in order to
cool down the sample and then resumed our testing at the
initial power level. We could therefore observe the added
effects of high-power exposure on the metal coating with
a minimal risk of sample destruction. In this subsection
and in Table III, the total heat duration is calculated as
the sum of all 10 s intervals of high-power exposure, disre-
garding the cooling time. Our goal was to define optimal
conditions in terms of repeatability and minimal total
exposure (i.e., both irradiation time and optical power).
The latter would potentially decrease the probability of
catastrophic sample damage or uncovering Eve’s opera-
tion. We have found that a minimum power level that
leads to the successful attack is 2.0 W (33.0 dBm) for
200 s exposure time. At 2.2 W (33.4 dBm) the effect is
achieved at shorter times varying from 30 to 50 s. Fi-
nally, exposure for only 10 s at 2.8 W (34.5 dBm) has
led to a steadily repeatable result over 9 sample points,
therefore this power value may be considered a consistent
attack threshold.
Typical attenuation curves before and after successful
attacks are shown in Fig. 11. “Indicated attenuation”
represents the programmed VOA setting [56]. An area of
lowered attenuation has appeared around each affected
sample point as the result of laser damage. Optical loss
gradually increases around the point and returns to nor-
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FIG. 12. Attenuation curve of VDMC VOA compromised in
suboptimal conditions. Green vertical lines denote the attenu-
ation settings at which optical damage was done. High-power
exposure parameters are given in the text.
mal after 0.5 dB shift in either direction. Figure 12 illus-
trates consequences of choosing suboptimal laser damage
conditions. When the optical power goes below 2.8 W
(e.g., 74.5 dB point, 2.5 W for 10 s), the curve structure
becomes asymmetric and attenuation is not minimized at
the point of damage. This effect is countered by increas-
ing the exposure time. However, the damage outcome
is more sensitive to power than time, as can be seen at
the second point in Fig. 12 (75.5 dB point, 2.2 W for
50 s), where the asymmetry becomes even more promi-
nent. Finally, lowered power and increased exposure time
(76.5 dB point, 2.2 W for 30 s) sometimes results in in-
creased loss value around the damaged area and/or a
slight shift of the attenuation minimum from the point
of damage. We attribute these effects to structural dam-
age of the sample such as the glass surface cracking or
the metal coating detaching owing to continuous local
overheating.
As explained earlier, the light beam passes through
the VDMC twice. We have verified that damaged areas
from different sample points never overlapped, ensuring
no interference between them in this experiment. To do
so, before taking each measurement we checked that at-
tenuator losses coincided with their initial level defined
during calibration. Also, the damage observed in most
samples was only at the first passage point.
Table III summarizes laser damage conditions and at-
tenuation decrease over 10 selected sample points dam-
aged under different conditions. A local minimum value
is given for each sample, even when the measurement
point did not perfectly coincide with the point of dam-
age (see Fig. 12). During a realistic attack Eve cannot
control the VOA setting in the source to access this local
minimum. Nevertheless, since our experiments indicate
that in suboptimal irradiation conditions the acquired at-
TABLE III. Optical damage results for several VDMC VOA
sample points.
Sample
point
Attenuation
before (dB)
Attenuation
after (dB)
∆
(dB)
Power
(W)
Total heat
duration (s)
1 5.29 3.0 −2.29 2.81 10
2 9.86 4.21 −5.65 2.81 20
3 27.29 12.78 −14.51 2.81 50
4 49.56 38.71 −10.85 2.22 30
5 52.76 40.18 −12.58 2.81 10
6 55.88 46.27 −9.61 2.50 20
7 56.98 44.45 −12.53 2.50 100
8 57.99 45.42 −12.57 2.50 10
9 60.09 52.87 −7.22 2.22 50
10 62.21 50.46 −11.75 1.98 200
tenuation value randomly fluctuates around the damage
point, it is reasonable to consider the worst-case scenario
when the minimum randomly aligns with the VOA set-
ting. Maximum attenuation decrease in optimal condi-
tions (2.8 W, 10 s) was −12.58 dB. Over all 18 sample
points, −9.54 dB mean change was observed. Minimum
change in attenuation (−2.29 dB) was observed in the
area of very low initial losses (5.29 dB).
2. Destructive testing and damage mechanism
After collecting all the data, we have performed a
destructive test at the programmed setting of 63 dB
(measured 46.9 dB). Increasing power between 2.8 W
and 4.4 W over 10 s did not affect attenuation any fur-
ther. Subsequently raising it to 4.5 W (36.5 dBm) ini-
tiated fiber fuse at the flat connector (FC) interface be-
tween VDMC VOA output and the beamsplitter arm.
As a result, the beamsplitter-side fiber was burnt while
VDMC VOA output connector remained seemingly un-
damaged. After re-splicing the damaged section, clean-
ing the connector and repeating the experiment we ob-
served the fuse again. Therefore this power setting may
be considered a limit in realistic conditions. In order to
study high exposure effects on the active element itself,
we proceeded with the tests, this time directly splicing
the beamsplitter arm to VDMC VOA output. Repeat-
edly applying to the same spot 4.5–6.8 W for 10 s (with
roughly 0.5 W step) resulted in dramatic drop in attenu-
ation of −20.7 dB in addition to the previous −11.3 dB,
totaling −32 dB decrease from the initial value. Af-
ter this point 6.8 W power was repeatedly applied for
30, 60, 180, 300 and 600 s without switching off the
EDFA. Measurements made after the first two pulses in-
dicated further slight decremental changes (−1.25 dB and
−1.07 dB), the third and the fourth had virtually no ef-
fect (< −0.1 dB), while the last led to a slight attenuation
increase (0.48 dB) probably due to structural damage of
the glass disk surface. Neither of these tests resulted in
breaking the active element and causing denial of service.
Mechanically disassembling VDMC VOA and analyz-
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ing the effects on the active element confirmed the ex-
pected damage mechanism of partial metal coating abla-
tion during laser damage. As can be seen in Fig. 10, con-
centric structures appear at the damage points after high
power exposure. A closer look reveals that they consist
of darker central parts and several brighter outer rings.
Formation of such structures is typical for laser ablation
processes in glasses with metal films or nanoparticles in
the near-surface layer [57–59]. They appear when glass
and metal particles are evaporated and melted away from
the center of affected area to cooler outer regions. We
also observed cracks on the glass surface around some
of the damaged regions (looks like X-wing starfighters
in Fig. 10), caused by overheating and local surface de-
fects. The proposed mechanism explains why attenua-
tion decrease is less pronounced at the sample regions
with lower attenuation, where the metal film is initially
much thinner (see Table III). The minimal achieved loss
is limited by insertion loss of the glass disk and other
attenuator components, whose experimentally measured
value was 1.7 dB.
V. STATISTICAL RISK ESTIMATE
The laser damage belongs to a class of attacks that
are not based on a clear physical model. The outcome of
such attack on a particular QKD system – either denial
of service or security breach – depends on a multitude of
factors difficult to predict in advance, and is only possible
to ascertain by experimental testing. (Other examples of
attacks in this class are detector control attacks [6, 12,
16–23] and timing attacks [3–5, 8, 14]. To give a contrary
example, a photon number splitting attack [33, 34] has
a well understood physical model, and its outcome can
be predicted theoretically based on system design and
specifications.)
In this setting, a risk prediction for untested QKD sys-
tems can be made by Bayesian analysis [60] after testing
a small subset of the systems. A crucial assumption here
is that this subset is chosen among the entire system
population at random. This assumption is currently not
possible to enforce with industrial QKD systems, because
many of them would not be made available for testing if
requested by us. However, we feel that our choice of the
samples for testing has been sufficiently wide ranging,
and we have not excluded any system from the testing
based on our expectations or its design. With this caveat,
we apply the Bayesian analysis.
After two QKD systems were tested and compromised
by the laser-damage attack in Ref. 13, a statistical pre-
diction was made that a significant fraction (> 20%) of
remaining untested QKD implementations were almost
certain (99.0% probability) to contain similar unpatched
loopholes. This was a practically relevant prediction: if
one-fifth of the existing systems were almost certain to
be vulnerable to the attack, then this was a serious secu-
rity risk, and the community needed to worry about this
attack.
The outcome of our present study is consistent with
this prediction. We remark that we have only tested one
component (optical attenuator) in one half of each QKD
system (the source) against one type of laser illumina-
tion (< 9 W c.w. at 1550 nm). Eve could in principle try
higher power, pulsed illumination regimes and different
wavelengths to improve her attack, and she could try at-
tacking the receiver side as well. Even with our restricted
testing, we have observed at least 2 attenuator types and
thus QKD systems that use them compromised.
Let’s update the Bayesian analysis prediction, taking
into account the additional outcomes from our present
study. For the sake of this discussion, we give the QKD
system containing the fixed attenuator a big benefit of
doubt, and assume the outcome to be the denial of ser-
vice. The systems containing the MEMS and VDMC
VOAs are considered to be compromised. The system
with the manual VOA is excluded from the statistics
so far, because a higher laser power is needed to com-
plete its testing. This leaves us (taking the two origi-
nal data points [13] into account) with 5 systems tested
to the date, out of which 1 denial-of-service and 4 se-
curity compromise outcomes have been observed. The
Bayesian analysis prediction then gives 99.5% probabil-
ity that > 20% of the remaining untested systems are
vulnerable [61]. This confirms that the laser-damage at-
tack on today’s QKD implementations should be taken
very seriously.
VI. COUNTERMEASURES
Countermeasures to this attack need to be developed
and tested. A straightforward countermeasure, a watch-
dog monitor, might not be sufficient, as the monitor it-
self can be destroyed under high power [13]. Optical
isolators, circulators, and manual attenuators are used
in some QKD systems (including commercial ones) to
add isolation between the vulnerable attenuator and the
quantum channel [62][63]. While this may protect the
vulnerable attenuator from the laser damage attack, the
isolators and circulators also need to be tested for laser
damage, which will be a future study. Alternatively we
propose to add a special passive component, an optical
fuse, at the source’s output. The optical fuse will only
tolerate a certain amount of laser power, and will per-
manently disconnect itself once injected power crosses a
threshold. In this way, this fuse physically interrupts the
injected high power and protects the system from the
laser damage attack. Such a device has been previously
proposed using a TeO2 soft glass segment inserted in-
line a standard fiber, which prevents pulses higher than
approximately 1 W (with duration ∼ 1 s) from passing
through [64]. Adopting this or similar technique into a
QKD system could be another future study.
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VII. CONCLUSION
In this work, four types of fiber-optic attenuators com-
monly used in QKD implementations have been tested
under high-power continuous-wave laser. The manual
variable attenuator exhibits minimal change during test-
ing. The fixed attenuator exhibits a temporary drop in
attenuation at 2.5 W (34 dBm) of optical power. The
MEMS VOA and VDMC VOA both show a permanent
and large – several decibel – decrease in attenuation. The
decreased attenuation results in the increased intensity
of transmitted states, which can be exploited by Eve to
compromise the security of QKD. This shows that the
mean photon number can be tampered with, which ef-
fectively breaks the fundamental assumption about the
mean photon number crucial in a QKD system with a
weak coherent source [31, 65]. Our study also confirms
earlier statistical predictions about the danger of the laser
damage attack on QKD.
The demonstrated attack shows one more way to break
the fundamental assumption about mean photon num-
bers in the QKD security proofs, in addition to a laser
seeding attack [36]. A detailed analysis of its effect on
decoy-state BB84 and MDI QKD protocols is given in
Ref. 36. We hope our work encourages the develop-
ment of non-leaky state preparation in MDI and device-
independent QKD systems.
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